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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECHES OF N. THOMPSON POWERS
AND MARY CORNISH
QUESTION, Professor King: When an employer enacts an af-
firmative action plan in the present context, is there the possibility of a
suit for reverse discrimination due to the issue of quotas?
ANSWER, Mr. Powers: Sure, that is a possibility. When an indi-
vidual is passed over for a promotion, that could be something that
would give rise to litigation. Our experience is that people tend not to
file charges because they have missed a promotion as long as they have
any hope that they may be promoted later on. If you consider race or
sex in terminating people, you are running a substantial risk that there
will be litigation. First, because the person at that point has nothing to
lose; and second, you are not just skating on thin ice, you are trying to
walk on water. There is just no support that I have found for taking
race and sex into account in termination.
QUESTION, Professor King- What you are saying is that litiga-
tion is unlikely because the person who is involved always has the hope
of receiving a promotion in some other context.
ANSWER, Mr. Powers: That is generally the situation.
QUESTION, Professor King- I suppose that it might be a little
different with unions or unionized companies?
ANSWER, Mr. Powers: Oh, sure.
QUESTION, Mr. Entin: Tom, you talked about the narrow tailor-
ing requirement in U.S. law. I take it that Canadian law does not have
this notion that we should not think in terms of race or sex unless there
is no real alternative. U.S. law, particularly after the Adarand case,
seems to rest on the notion that we just should not do that unless there
is no real alternative. I guess I want to ask Mary Cornish if that is
reflected in Canadian law. And I also want to ask Tom if you could
talk a little more in terms of what other alternatives might be out there
and what an employer would have to be competent of being able to
show to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement that we have under
U.S. law.
ANSWER, Ms. Cornish: Unlike the American situation, we also
have a Charter of Rights which has a quality section that is part of the
Constitution. In that Charter of Rights quality section, there is a spe-
cific subsection which authorizes affirmative action for special mea-
sures. So within the Constitution itself there is an authorization for
special measures. In addition, I think almost every Human Rights
Code has a section authorizing special measures. So we have not had
this same kind of attack on it.
Nevertheless, we have had attacks. For example, I was involved in
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a case where the government was arguing that it had an assistive de-
vices program which only gave assistive devices to people up to the age
of twenty-three. The person in this case needed a closed circuit televi-
sion magnifier. However, because he was fifty-five, he was excluded
from the program.
The government argued that because the program as a whole was
a special measure, they could make whatever measures they wanted to
make within the program. As a result, this special measures section had
insulated their program from any attack. The Ontario Court of Ap-
peals, in Roberts disagreed. The court found that if you have a special
program, you cannot then internally, within that program, say you are
going to hand out the assistive devices on the basis of race. However,
they did say that you may be able to base it on race if you could ration-
ally connect the provision of the program on the basis of race. For ex-
ample, if you had limited funding and you had to decide who was going
to get assistive devices, you may in fact look around to determine which
group might be the most needy. Or in terms of age, if you could deter-
mine that younger people needed these devices more, then you might
have been able to have an age requirement. But you had to have some
basis upon which to say that.
Essentially the government has used age as a funding technique. It
determined how many people it believed were under the age of twenty-
three and said that is it. They then came into the court and said, "we
do not have the money to go about this." The court responded, "well,
you cannot do it that way. You cannot just say that you are going to
use a prohibitive ground because of cost." That gives you some idea of
how the courts would look at it.
COMMENT, Mr. Powers: I am not sure that the constitutional
standard that requires narrow tailoring is going to become a statutory
standard. Also, while I think Justice O'Connor would be inclined to
move the law that way, until she does it, we cannot be sure that it is
required. But I think it is prudent to consider how you would respond
to the suggestion that you have not narrowly tailored this; that you
have not given adequate consideration to less specific means of taking
race and sex into account.
I would start with expanded and focused recruitment to help over-
come current underutilization. To the extent that using expanded re-
cruitment has not eliminated the underutilization, evidence exists that
you need something more direct and specific, such as targeted goals.
QUESTION, Mr. Delay: In the United States, it was often said as
justification of affirmative action that it would make the American
economy grow stronger and that the discriminated groups would them-
selves grow stronger if these practices were put in place. Yet we have
not seen the results in the African-American community in terms of
overall economic improvement. When we try to talk about pay equity
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schemes and discrimination schemes in the global context, it is often
used as an enticement to say that sustainable development will occur if
pay equity schemes are put into place. But it seems to me that the
fastest growing economies in the world are those of Japan, South Ko-
rea, the Philippines, Chile, and Indonesia, all of which have no pay
equity schemes. Is it not true, really, that this is more of a mirage, a
dream to say that pay equity pursues sustainable development? Is this
not really just an aspiration of certain groups within aging industrial
democracies that have freedom in equality as some sort of false ethical
underpinning? Do we have any economic data to prove that sustainable
development is greatly enhanced when we pursue things like pay
equity?
ANSWER, Ms. Cornish: I know that governments still sign docu-
ments that say that. I mean, literally these world documents actually
refer to this. But it is interesting in two aspects. First, I think that in
terms of looking at it in a world context, you are not necessarily going
to see pay looked at in the same context. For example, in the Bejing
Declaration. You also have in some of the economies that you are
describing people talking more in relation to women being self-em-
ployed. Women in agricultural sectors, for example. We would not
think of it as pay equity in the sense that you would think of pay equity
laws in Canada. So I think there is some different context in which it is
looked at. But certainly what is interesting in Ontario, and I guess this
is part of the debate over the fiscal conservative agenda, is that at the
moment it is based at driving the wage rate down in Ontario. There
have been a number of ways in which that has been done, both by
reducing labor laws to discourage unionization, and now by taking
away pay equity, because women in fact received money. And one of
the things I may not have talked about was that women got money
under this pay equity law. Discrimination was identified; they got
money, then everybody says to them, "hey, I am really sorry, we can-
not afford this."
Secondly, in good times nobody can afford it either. Essentially, no
one ever wants to afford it if it requires employers to pay. I think, at
times, it takes more sophisticated employers to sort this out in order to
see that their future is not in trying to figure out how to have a Mexi-
can wage in Canada and the United States.
COMMENT, Ms. Houston: We looked at exactly the same issue
that is being addressed in trying to make a business case for justifying
any affirmative action in our corporation. One of the things we did was
to look at the economic analysis of those countries that are experienc-
ing the largest economic growth. We lined those up with some addi-
tional measures based on the context of the culture. Most of those
countries that you have named are constituted quite differently demo-
graphically than either Canada or the United States. And it is simply a
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social demographic fact of life that countries will deal with this issue
differently. Our work forces are constituted quite differently. The de-
mands that are being made by the populations are quite different. So
when we are looking at some of these initiatives, I think it is really
some of these barriers of productivity that in fact have created some of
the issues that were raised in the question.
COMMENT, Mr. Powers: Those comments also raise questions
about the empirical basis for affirmative action. I think there is no
question that affirmative action has significantly increased employment
opportunities for minorities and women. I think the argument against
affirmative action is not that it does not work, it is that it works too
well for the satisfaction of some people. It seems to me that it is, in a
sense, rough justice, but I think it is a justice that is needed. I do not
know what the situation is in other countries. I think in this country it
is very important for us to be able to demonstrate, particularly with
minorities, that opportunities exist, in fact, and that results are being
achieved. I think affirmative action has done a good job in helping us
along that road. I hope we stay the course. I do not think that there are
many white males who would say that it is a disadvantage to be a white
male.
QUESTION, Mr. Wismer: First, I am curious as to what really
happened with the pay equity, equal pay for work of equal value and
how women did? What happened to the wage levels with respect to
nurses and policeman? Two, how did it work? Who were the arbiters
as to what work was of equal value, and how was that handled?
ANSWER, Ms. Cornish: The process of adjudication was in-
volved. The Pay Equity Commission, which provided both educational
consulting services to both employers and unions, had an initial level of
adjudication at that stage by a review officer which could then be ap-
pealed to a Tribunal. None of these are in the courts. They are basi-
cally specialized tribunals which deal solely with pay equity in the ad-
judication of those issues.
In the nursing context, the litigation went on for about four years
regarding what the gender-neutral comparison system should be. Em-
ployers attempted to use existing compensation systems such as job
evaluation systems. There was lengthy litigation over those systems,
and whether or not they were gender-biased.
In answering question two, two different sectors of the health care
industry were in fact found to be gender-biased. The parties then went
out and negotiated again and ultimately arrived at a settlement in
which they came up with a competent comparator. In the end they
actually did not come up with a specific job. Nurses in Ontario received
very substantial wage increases as a result of the process. Another ex-
ample, a university used what was called a policy-capturing approach,
or more of a wage-line approach. It was determined that female job
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classes earned on average $2,800 less than if they had been a male job
class. As a result, the female job classes within the university went up
$2,800. But again, this was phased in at one percent of payroll. In
other words, you did not just get $2,800. You would get it over a period
of time.
A secretary of a school board was compared to the grounds keeper
of the school board. You might also have a cashier being compared to a
stock clerk within a retail grocery store chain. So those are the kinds of
examples of comparisons.
Just to reiterate, I think the real problem that the pay equity law
had in Ontario was its success. There was a high number of female job
classes in social service agencies and in public sector agencies. The gov-
ernment assisted these various agencies in funding these adjustments.
When this government came in intent on downsizing the govern-
ment and downsizing the budget, one of the immediate problems was
this funding. Thus, the first thing they did was cap the funding that
had been done. In addition, in Ontario there is also a process. The ini-
tial Pay Equity Act only dealt with those situations in which you actu-
ally did this comparison and found a comparable situation. The male
job class had to be comparable. But part of the problem was that many
sectors, particularly, for example, daycare centers and nursing homes,
had no comparable male job classes because they are so female-domi-
nated that there are not enough male jobs. In the end, they came up
with legislative amendments concerning "proportional comparison,"
which allowed for this wage line process for the male jobs. In addition,
they came up with "proxy comparison." So that if you had no male job
at all within your workplace, in the public sector only, you were desig-
nated a job in another public sector agency. Thus, for example, workers
in individual rape crisis centers did not have another male in the
center. They ended up getting the same adjustment, relatively speak-
ing, as the abuse worker in a hospital that had a larger pool of male
jobs to actually make the comparison with. That particular technique
was repealed by the Ontario government in December in its Finance
Bill. They repealed proxy comparisons and limited the adjustments on
it. So that gives you some idea of how it is carried out.
QUESTION, Professor King- I would ask Tom about the timing.
I suppose the ultimate decision will be made in the next election on
affirmative action, in terms of traditional appointments. Would you say
that, Tom?
ANSWER, Mr. Powers: Certainly that will have a big effect. I
think it is only a matter of time until Justice Blackmun is ready to
retire or be replaced. He is the one that seems to be closest. When we
will get another case is hard to say. I think there is a case coming out
of the Third Circuit which is going to be another loser for affirmative
action. We will just have to see.
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